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iv 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (2009) and Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) 
(2009) confers jurisdiction on this Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Plaintiffs Tracy L. Southwick ("Tracy"), Vicki L. Southwick, and the Southwick 
Family Trust1 appeal from the trial court's August 18, 2009, Order and Judgment. (R. 
1024-1026.)2 (see Addendum A) 
Issue No, 1: Did the trial court err in concluding that Phillip Southwick 
("Phillip"), trustee of the Don B. Southwick and Barbara P. Southwick Irrevocable Trust 
(the "Trust"), did not breach his duty of loyalty to Tracy, a Trust beneficiary, when 
Phillip disregarded Tracy's interest and divided Tracy's share of the Trust proceeds 
between himself (Phillip) and the third Trust beneficiary, Phillip's step-brother Robert 
Milner? (R. 001025, 001072-1074). 
Determinative Law: Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-802 ("Duty of loyalty"); Pepper v. 
Zions First National Bank N.A., 801 P.2d 144, 151 (Utah 1990) ("[TJrustees are charged 
as fiduciaries with one of the highest duties of care and loyalty known in the law."); 
Wheeler v. Mann, 763 P.2d 758, 759-60 (Utah 1988) ("A trustee has a duty of loyalty to 
1
 Tracy and Vicki are the trustees the "Southwick Family Trust" to which Tracy and his 
children have assigned all distributions that may be received from the Trust. (PI. Ex. 
33)(R. 1009) 
2
 Citations to the record within this brief are as follows: (1) references to record pages 
are preceded by "R."; (2) portions of the two trial transcript volumes are referred to as 
"Tr." followed by the record number and the page; and (3) trial exhibits are cited as "PI. 
Ex." or "Def. Ex." 
1 
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the beneficiaries of the trust.'V; Eagar v. Burrows, 2008 UT 42, P25, 191 P.3d 9 ("duty 
of loyalty [also] requires ...[him] to exercise prudence and skill in administering the 
trust.") National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 918 
(Utah 1993) (A trustee's fiduciary duty of loyalty requires that he "exercise prudence and 
skill in administering the trust."). 
Standard of Review: The trial court's decision is a question of law and implicates 
statutory interpretation, which is reviewed by this Court for correctness. See Li v. Enter. 
Rent-A-Car Co., 2006 UT 80, ^  8, 150 P.3d 471; United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater 
Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah \993);.Div. of Consumer Protection v. Rio Vista 
Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990) ("We accord a lower court's statutory 
interpretations no particular deference but assess them for correctness, as we do any other 
conclusion of law.'"'). A trial court's decision to, in effect, deny a beneficiary his vested 
interest in a Trust presents this Court with a question of law, which is reviewed for 
correctness. Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1996); United Park City Mines Co. 
v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993). 
Issue No. 2: Did the trial court err by concluding that Tracy was not entitled to his 
equal share of the Trust proceeds under the theory of equitable estoppel where there was 
no evidence to support a conclusion of detrimental reliance by Phillip? (R. 1024-1025, 
1074-1075). 
Determinative Law: IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D&K Management, 2008 UT 
73, 196 P.3d 588; Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27, 207 P.3d 
1235; Bahr v. Imus, 2009 UT App 155, 211 P.3d 987; Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. 
2 
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Co, 699 P.2d 688, 691 (Utah 1985) ("The elements of equitable estoppel are: 'conduct by 
one party which leads another party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of action 
resulting in detriment or damage if the first party is permitted to repudiate his conduct.'") 
(quoting United American Life Ins. Co. v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 641 P.2d 158, 161 
(Utah 1982)); Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 790 (Utah App. 1987), ("(1) a false 
representation or concealment of material facts; (2) made with knowledge, actual or 
constructive, of the facts; (3) made to a party who is without knowledge or the means of 
knowledge of the real facts; (4) made with the intention that the representation be acted 
upon; and (5) the party to whom the representation was made relied or acted upon it to 
his prejudice.); Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100, P34, 989 P.2d 
1077. 
Standard of Review: The trial court's decision is a question of law and implicates 
statutory interpretation, which is reviewed by this Court for correctness. See Li v. Enter. 
Rent-A-Car Co., 2006 UT 80, ^ 8, 150 P.3d 471; United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater 
Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993).D/v. of Consumer Protection v. Rio Vista 
Oil Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990) ("We accord a lower court's statutory 
interpretations no particular deference but assess them for correctness, as we do any other 
conclusion of law."). A trial court's decision to, in effect, deny a beneficiary his vested 
interest in a Trust presents this Court with a question of law, which is reviewed for 
correctness. Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1996); United Park City Mines Co. 
v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993). 
SLC 603962.1 
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STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
A. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-802 ("Duty of loyalty") 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Phillip, as trustee, divided the assets of his parents' Trust between himself and 
Robert Milner, one of his two brothers, but decided not to distribute any Trust assets to 
his third brother, Tracy. All three brothers were equal beneficiaries of the Trust. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 21f 3 (Oct. 9, 2009)(R. 1066-1075). 
Phillip's decision to deny Tracy a Trust distribution was based on Phillip's interpretation 
of a document from Tracy purporting to waive and assign to Phillip Tracy's interest in 
the Trust and Phillip's interpretation of statements in two letters written by Tracy. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 6134, 8-9 HI 8-11 (Oct. 9, 2009)(R. 1066-
1075) 
Tracy contends that Phillip unreasonably relied on the waiver document because it 
failed to satisfy the disclaimer statute, because statements in Tracy's two letters confirm 
that Tracy did not intend to waive his Trust interest, because the Trust Agreement 
prohibited any assignment of a Trust interest, and because Phillip's conclusion to exclude 
Tracy was self-serving and fails to protect the Tracy's interest as a beneficiary. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
Tracy Southwick filed his complaint on January 4, 2006. (R. 1-26.) A two-day 
bench trial was conducted before district court Judge Ben H. Hadfield on June 16-17, 
2009. (R. 1004-1009.) Following the bench trial, Judge Hadfield concluded that Tracy 
4 
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Southwick was an equal beneficiary of the Trust (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law at 2, If 3 (Oct. 9, 2009)(R. 1066-1075); that Phillip Southwick had not breached his 
fiduciary duty to Tracy Southwick (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9, ^  12 
(Oct. 9, 2009)(R. 1066-1075); and, that even though Tracy Southwick was a beneficiary, 
he was equitably estopped from receiving a portion of a year 2005 Trust distribution 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9, Tf 14 (Oct. 9, 2009)(R. 1066-1075). Tracy 
Southwick filed his Notice of Appeal of the Court's Order and Judgment. (R. 1082-
1083.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In September 1989, Don B. Southwick and Barbara P. Southwick executed a Trust 
Agreement (the "Trust Agreement") forming the Don B. Southwick and Barbara P. 
Southwick Irrevocable Trust. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2 ^  1 (Oct. 9, 
2009)(R. 1066-1075))(R. 17-24, 1008; Plaintiffs' Trial Ex. 1.) 
Phillip served as Trustee of the Trust since its inception. (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law at 2 [^ 5.) Phillip and his brothers Tracy and Robert Milner are the 
three beneficiaries of the Trust. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2 f 3.)(R. 
1067.); (Order and Judgment at 2 If 5)(R. 1025). 
On or about January 31, 1992, Tracy signed a document purporting to disclaim his 
interest in the Trust, and purporting to transfer his interest to Phillip (the "Waiver and 
Assignment"). (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 3 f 15)(R. 
1068)(Defendant's Trial Ex. 6.) The Trust Agreement prohibits any beneficiary from 
5 
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transferring or assigning their interest in the Trust. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law at 213.)(R. 1067.); (Trust Agreement Art. 5: "Spendthrift Provision") (R. 22.) 
Barbara Southwick told Phillip that she wanted the Trust assets to be distributed 
only to Phillip and Robert Milner. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 5 f^ 
26.)(R. 1070.) 
Tracy testified that in the summer of 2001 he spoke to Phillip to inquire about his 
(Tracy's) interest in the Trust and Phillip told Tracy that Tracy no longer had an interest 
in the Trust because of the Waiver and Assignment, but Tracy refuted signing the Waiver 
and Assignment. (R. 1091) (Tr. 72:4-13, 25-73:25); (R. 1091)(Tr. p. 205: 15-19.) 
On February 24, 2002, Barbara Southwick died, at which time the Trust directed 
that the Trust assets be distributed equally between Phillip, Robert and Tracy. (Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2 U 1, 3; 5 f 29.)(R. 1067, 1070.) (Plaintiffs' Trial Ex. 
1.) 
After Barbara Southwick's death and funeral in 2002, Tracy wrote Phillip a letter 
dated April 7, 2002, (and Tracy wrote a similar letter to Robert Milner, dated April 20, 
2002) wherein Tracy stated that Tracy did not remember whether or not he signed the 
Waiver and Assignment, that he was not going to do anything about the Trust, and that 
Phillip and Robert could do anything they wanted with the Trust assets. (Findings of Fact 
3
 Barbara Southwick was Tracy Southwick9s step-mother, and she received her 
husband's, Don Southwick's, interest in the Trust and became its sole beneficiary (with 
Phillip, Tracy and Robert as contingent beneficiaries) pursuant to a divorce decree. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2 f 8.)(R. 1067.) 
6 
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and Conclusions of Law at 5-6 fflf 30-3 l.)(see Addendum B) (R. 1070-71.) (Def. Trial 
Exs. 7-8). 
In his letters, Tracy also stated: 
To Phillip: "\ have one question for you, brother. Do you think that I, or anybody 
else, for that matter, would intentionally and knowingly sign away their 
inheritance? No. And neither would you." Id. 
To Robert: "Do you think I would intentionally sign away my inheritance? Would 
you? I don't know of anybody that would." Id. 
Phillip testified that when he received Tracy's April 2002 letter that he had 
previously spoken with Tracy and Tracy confirmed his belief that he (Tracy) was still a 
beneficiary of the Trust. (R. 1091)(Tr. p. 205: 15-19.) Phillip also testified that he never 
spoke with Tracy about Tracy's statements in Tracy's April 2002 letter. (R. 1091) (Tr. p. 
207.) 
Phillip considered the Waiver and Assignment and Tracy's April 2002 letters as 
confirmation of Tracy's intent to disclaim his interest in the Trust. (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law at 8 If 8) (R. 1073); (R. 1091) (Tr. p. 254.) 
On or about March 9, 2005, Phillip sold the Trust's property in Lehi, Utah for 
$300,000 and divided the proceeds equally between himself (Phillip) and Robert Milner. 
(PL Tr. Ex. 15) (R. 1008); (R. 1091)(Tr. at p. 171-172). 
Tracy received no distribution from the sale of the Lehi, Utah property. Id. 
SLC 603962 1 
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The trial court concluded that Phillip's reliance on Tracy's statements would 
operate to Phillip's detriment if Tracy was allowed to assert that he did not renounce his 
interest in the Trust or that he did not renounce his claim to an interest in the Trust assets. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9 % 11.) (R. 1074.) 
The trial court concluded that Tracy was estopped from asserting that prior to 
filing the Complaint that he did not renounce his interest in the Trust. (Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law at 9 f 14.) (R. 1074.); (Order and Judgment at 2 f 1-3)(R. 1025). 
The trial court concluded that the Waiver and Assignment did not comply with the 
applicable disclaimer statute in force in 1992, Utah Code § 75-2-802 (1991). (Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9 f 15.) (R. 191, 1074.) (see Utah Code § 75-2-802 
(1991) attached as Addendum C.) 
The trial court concluded that Tracy is entitled as a beneficiary of the Trust to 
receive his one-third share of the remaining assets in the Trust. (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law at 9 J 16.) (R. 1074.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Phillip breached his duty of loyalty when he interpreted the Waiver and 
Assignment and Tracy's statements in Tracy's two April 2002 letters in a way that 
benefited himself (Phillip) and not Tracy, by concluding that Tracy desired to waive or 
disclaim his (Tracy's) interest in the trust, and by dividing the Trust assets (including 
Tracy's share) between himself (Phillip) and his other brother, Robert. 
SLC 603962 1 
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Appellants' position is that it was unreasonable and a breach of Phillip's fiduciary 
duty to disregard Tracy's interest in the Trust by relying on a legally ineffective Waiver 
and Assignment and to rely on statements in Tracy's two letters, and where Phillip was 
relying on his mother's (Barbara's) desire that Tracy receive no assets from the Trust, 
and where Tracy confirmed on the phone and in his two letters that he would "not sign 
away his inheritance," and where Phillip made no effort to contact Tracy after receiving 
the letters to determine Tracy's intent, prior to Phillip's dividing the proceeds from the 
sale of Trust assets between himself (Phillip) and his brother, Robert Milner. 
Lack of Detrimental Reliance 
Appellants' contend that Tracy Southwick should not be estopped from receiving 
his share of the prior Trust distribution because Phillip would not be injured if he were 
ordered to return Tracy's share of the Trust distribution to Tracy because Phillip was 
never entitled to Tracy share of the Trust assets, and there is no evidence supporting the 
trial court's conclusion of detrimental reliance by Phillip. 
The trial court's August 18, 2009, Order and Judgment should be vacated, and 
Appellants should be entitled to receive Tracy's equal share of the Trust distribution. 
ARGUMENT 
A. PHILLIP BREACHED HIS DUTY OF LOYALTY TO TRACY. 
The Court should reverse the trial court's finding that Phillip did not breach his 
fiduciary duty when he excluded Tracy from the trust distribution. Phillip, as trustee of 
the Trust, "has a duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries of a trust." Wheeler v. Mann, 763 
P.2d 758, 759-760 (1988) (citing Farley v. Farley, 431 P.2d 133, 137-38 (1967)). This 
9 
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duty of loyalty includes that "a trustee is not permitted... 4to place himself in a position 
where it would be for his own benefit to violate his duty to the beneficiaries/" Wheeler, 
763 P.2d at 760 (citing IIA Scott, Trusts § 170, at 311 (4th ed. 1987)). This duty of a 
trustee has been referred to as "one of the highest duties of care and loyalty known in the 
law." Pepper v. Zions First Nat. BankJt.A., 801 P.2d 144, 151 (Utah 1990). 
Here, Phillip's duty of loyalty to Tracy required that Phillip administer the Trust 
"solely in the interest of the beneficiary." Id., citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 
170 (1959). Phillip breached this duty by unreasonably relying on the 1992 Waiver and 
Assignment, the April 2002 Letters, and the wishes of his deceased mother when he made 
distributions to himself and to Robert. 
1992 Waiver and Assignment 
Phillip unreasonably relied on the 1992 Waiver and Assignment when he excluded 
Tracy from receiving trust distributions. The trial court found that Phillip relied on the 
Waiver and Assignment in choosing whether to distribute to Tracy (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law at 8 ^ 8) (R. 1073). However, the Trust Agreement prohibited any 
assignment of any interest in the Trust (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2 % 
3.)(R. 1067.); (Trust Agreement Art. 5: "Spendthrift Provision") (R. 22.). Moreover, the 
trial court concluded that the Waiver and Assignment did not comply with the statutory 
requirements for a disclaimer. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9 ^ f 15.) (R. 
1074.) Furthermore, Tracy and Phillip both testified that when Tracy spoke to Phillip in 
the summer of 2001 that Tracy denied ever signing the Waiver and Assignment. (R. 
1091) (Tr. 72:4-13, 25-73:25); (R. 1091)(Tr. p. 205: 15-19.) 
10 
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April 2002 Letters 
The trial court also found that Phillip relied on statements in Tracy's two letters 
that Tracy "was not going to do anything about the Trust, and that Phillip and Robert 
could do whatever they wanted with the Trust assets." (Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law at 5-6 fflf 30-31.) (R. 1070-71.) But this finding ignores subsequent statements in 
Tracy's letters, which confirmed that Tracy would not have signed away his inheritance. 
Id. Phillip therefore could not have reasonably relied on these letters, and the trial court's 
finding should be reversed. 
Barbara Southwick's Statements 
The court also found that Phillip's, Tracy's and Robert's mother, Barbara 
Southwick, wanted the trust assets to be divided only between Phillip and Robert. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 5 ^ j 26.)(R. 1070.) However, as the trustee, 
Phillip was bound to make distributions in accordance with the Trust Agreement. Phillip 
only confirmed his bias against Tracy when Phillip testified that he was attempting to 
follow Barbara's desire (not the Trust Agreement) that Tracy not receive any Trust assets. 
(R. 1091)(Tr. p. 247-248.) 
Phillip breached his fiduciary duty by relying on the Waiver and Assignment, the 
Letters, and Barbara Southwick's wishes when he excluded Tracy from the distribution. 
Phillip did not sell the Trust's real property in Lehi, Utah, until March 2005, nearly three 
years after receiving Tracy's letters. (PI. Tr. Ex. 15) (R. 1008); (R. 1091)(Tr. at p. 171-
172) By that time, Phillip had received both the Waiver and Assignment and Tracy's 
letters, in which Tracy confirmed he would never sign away his inheritance. Further 
11 
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more, Tracy had contacted Phillip and denied signing the Waiver and Assignment. Yet, 
prior to distributing the proceeds from the Trust property sale, Phillip did not contact 
Tracy to confirm whether or not Tracy desired to disclaim his interest in the Trust. 
Instead, Phillip made the self-serving decision to disregard Tracy's interest as waived or 
disclaimed and to divide Tracy's interest in the Trust between himself (Phillip) and 
Robert Milner, the third beneficiary. In the face of such contradictory statements from 
Tracy, it was unreasonable for Phillip to assume that Tracy desired to disclaim his 
interest in the Trust. Therefore, when Phillip decided to distribute the Trust assets to 
himself and Robert Milner and to exclude Tracy, Phillip breached his duty of loyalty to 
Tracy. In re Estate ofPlassman, 2009 WL 1175518 (Mich.App. 2009) (When a personal 
representative improperly permitted the disclaimer of a portion of estate assets she was 
found to have breached her fiduciary duty.) 
Phillip's duty of loyalty to Tracy also required that Phillip administer the Trust 
with prudence and skill. Eagar v. Burrows, 2008 UT 42, P25, 191 P.3d 9 ("duty of 
loyalty [also] requires ...[him] to exercise prudence and skill in administering the trust.") 
National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 918 (Utah 
1993) (A trustee's fiduciary duty of loyalty requires that he "exercise prudence and skill 
in administering the trust."). Prudence requires that Phillip should have sought a 
determination by the court as to Tracy's status as a beneficiary, rather than unilaterally 
choosing a position that injured Tracy while enriching Phillip. Phillip's treatment of 
Tracy's interest was not "solely in the interest of the beneficiary" and therefore was a 
breach of Phillip's fiduciary duty of loyalty to Tracy. 
12 
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The court should reverse the trial court's finding that Phillip did not breach his 
fiduciary duty and should hold that Phillip breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty to Tracy 
when he concluded that Tracy had waived or disclaimed his interest in the Trust and 
when Phillip failed to distribute any Trust assets to Tracy in 2005. 
B* NO EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COURT'S CONCLUSION OF 
DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE BY PHILLIP. 
The trial court erred in concluding that Tracy was equitably estopped from 
asserting a claim to pre-Complaint distributions from the Trust, including receiving his 
one-third share of the Trust's proceeds from the year 2005 sale of its Lehi, Utah property, 
because there is no evidence of detrimental reliance. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law at 9 If 14.) (R. 1074.); (Order and Judgment at 2 ^ 1-3)(R. 1025). 
"The elements of equitable estoppel are: 'conduct by one party which leads 
another party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of action resulting in detriment or 
damage if the first party is permitted to repudiate his conduct."9 Blackhurst v. 
Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688, 691 (Utah 1985) (quoting United American Life 
Ins. Co. v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 641 P.2d 158, 161 (Utah 1982)). Here, Phillip did not 
rely to his detriment on the Waiver and Assignment or on Tracy's April 2002 letters 
because Phillip was enriched by receiving Tracy's interest and there is no evidence that 
Phillip would be injured if he was ordered to disgorge something that he was not entitled 
to receive—Tracy's interest in the Trust. Lewis v. State, Dep't of Health and 
Rehabilitative Servs., 659 So.2d 1255, 1257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that there 
SLC 603962 1 
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is no detrimental reliance where the only harm was the inability to retain money which 
never should have been received). 
Although the trial court concluded that Phillip's reliance on Tracy's statements 
would operate to Phillip's detriment if Tracy was allowed to assert his interest in the 
Trust (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9 f 11.) (R. 1074.), there is no 
evidence in the record to support this conclusion. Phillip failed to present evidence of 
detrimental reliance including any detriment that might occur as a result of being ordered 
to return a portion of his Trust distribution to Tracy. And, equitable estoppel cannot be 
found in the absence of detrimental reliance. Brinkerhoffv. Brinkerhoff, 945 P.2d 113, 
117 (Utah Ct.App. 1997). 
The court should reverse the trial court's order because there is no record evidence 
to support a finding of detrimental reliance by Phillip and therefore Tracy should not be 
estopped from asserting his claim to and receiving his share of the Trust distributions. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Appellants respectfully request an order vacating and 
reversing the trial court's August 18, 2009, Order and Judgment and finding that Phillip 
Southwick breached his fiduciary duty to Tracy Southwick and that Tracy Southwick can 
assert his claim for his equal share of the Trust assets prior to the date the Complaint was 
filed; and remanding for a determination of damages for Tracy Southwick in an amount 
equal to Tracy Southwick's share of the Trust distributions prior to filing the Complaint; 
and such additional relief as the court deems appropriate. 
14 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN BOX ELDER COUNTY 
BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY L. SOUTHWICK, individually, 
and TRACY L. SOUTHWICK and VICKIE 
L. SOUTHWICK, in their capacity as 
trustees of the SOUTHWICK FAMILY 
TRUST 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PHILLIP D. SOUTHWICK, individually 
and as trustee of the DON B. SOUTHWICK 
AND BARBARA P. SOUTHWICK 
IRREVOCABLE TRUST, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 060100003 
Judge Ben H. Hadfield 
THIS MATTER came before the Court during a two-day bench trial on June 16-17, 2009. 
The parties and their respective attorneys of record were present. The parties presented their 
evidence and made argument to the Court. The Court issued a ruling from the bench at the close 
1 {AUG U 2009 
of argument. Based upon the evidence admitted at trial, the arguments presented and the law 
relevant to this matter, the Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and based 
thereon, 
HEREBY ENTERS JUDGMENT as follows: 
1. Tracy L. Southwick ("Tracy") is equitably estopped from asserting that, prior to 
the filing of the Complaint in the above-entitled matter, he did not renounce his beneficial 
interest in the Trust by signing the Wavier and Assignment. 
2. Tracy is equitably estopped from asserting any claim or right to any Trust 
property which was liquidated, transferred or otherwise distributed prior to the filing of the 
Complaint in the above-entitled matter, he did not renounce his beneficial interest in the Trust by 
signing the Wavier and Assignment. 
3. Tracy is equitably estopped from asserting any claim for damages for breach of 
fiduciary duties or other Trust obligations against the Trustee, Phillip D. Southwick ("Phillip") 
for actions he took as Trustee prior to the filing of the Complaint in the above-entitled matter. 
4. Tracy is not entitled to any compensation for any disbursements of Trust property 
or proceeds of Trust property, or the management thereof, prior to the filing of the Complaint in 
the above-entitled matter. 
5. Tracy, Robert S. Milner ("Robert"), and Phillip are beneficiaries of the Trust. 
6. Phillip shall continue to serve as the Trustee of the Trust. 
7. All parties shall be responsible for their own attorneys fees and costs incurred in 
this matter. 
2 
DATED this /ff day of h , . 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
. ;72-fi.k 
Judge Ben H. HadfieL 
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Stephen F. Noel (7952) 
SMITH KNOWLES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200 
Ogden, UT 84403 
Telephone: (801)476-0303 
Facsimile: (801)476-0399 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN BOX ELDER COUNTY 
BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY L. SOUTHWICK, individually, 
and TRACY L. SOUTHWICK and VICKIE 
L. SOUTHWICK, in their capacity as 
trustees of the SOUTHWICK FAMILY 
TRUST 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PHILLIP D. SOUTHWICK, individually 
and as trustee of the DON B. SOUTHWICK 
AND BARBARA P. SOUTHWICK 
IRREVOCABLE TRUST, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 060100003 
Judge Ben H. Hadfield 
THIS MATTER came before the Court on a bench trial on June 16-17, 2009. The parties 
and their respective attorneys of record were present. The Court heard testimony, received 
1
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exhibits, and considered the credibility of the witnesses and arguments of counsel. Now being 
fully advised, the Court hereby enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On September 13, 1989, a Trust Agreement was executed by Don Southwick 
("Don") and Barbara Southwick ("Barbara"), as husband and wife, for the purpose of creating a 
Trust. 
2. The Trust Agreement was drafted by attorney Dale M. Dorius. 
3. The Trust Agreement provided that Phillip D. Southwick ("Phillip"), Robert S. 
Milner ("Robert"), and Tracy L. Southwick ("Tracy") were beneficiaries of the Trust. 
4. Robert is Barbara's son from a previous marriage, Tracy is Don's son from a 
previous marriage, and Phillip is the son of both Don and Barbara. 
5. The Trust Agreement provided for Phillip to serve as the Trustee of the Trust. 
6. The Trust Agreement provided that Phillip was to disburse to Don and Barbara 
"such amounts from the principal or income of the Trust Estate as they shall from time to time 
direct" during their lifetimes. 
7. On November 4, 1991, a Decree of Divorce was issued by Judge Gunnell 
dissolving Don and Barbara's marriage. 
8. The Decree of Divorce mandated that Barbara P. Southwick was to be the sole 
beneficiary of the Trust and directed "the Trustee, Phillip D. Southwick, to do whatever is 
necessary to . . . make Barbara P. Southwick the sole beneficiary of the assets in the trust as her 
sole and separate property." 
2 
9. Phillip was aware of the divorce proceedings while they were pending and was 
aware of the result of the divorce at the time it was issued and relied upon the Decree of Divorce 
in performing his duties as Trustee of the Trust going forward. Specifically, Phillip reasonably 
understood that his mother, Barbara, was to be the sole owner and/or beneficiary of all of the 
Trust assets and as such could control them. 
10. Consistent with the Decree of Divorce, Don and Barbara signed a document 
referred to herein as the Joint Release. 
11. The Joint Release directed Phillip "to convey and transfer all of the assets located 
in said trust to Barbara P. Southwick as the sole beneficiary under the terms of said Trust 
Agreement." 
12. Barbara delivered the signed Joint Release to Phillip on or about December 12, 
1991. 
13. Phillip approved and accepted into the Trust the Joint Release on December 12, 
1991. 
14. Tracy knew about the existence of the Trust and his beneficial interest therein 
within a few weeks after Don and Barbara's divorce at the latest. 
15. On January 31,1992, Tracy signed a document which had been prepared by 
attorney Dale M. Dorius as per Barbara Southwick's instructions and which is referred to herein 
as the Waiver and Assignment. At this time, Tracy was aware of the outcome of the divorce, 
namely the property distribution and Barbara's status as the sole beneficiary of the Trust and that 
all trust assets were to be transferred to her. 
3 t i n i > : i , L S 
16. In signing the Waiver and Assignment, Tracy purported to renounce "any claim 
he may have in any of the Trust Estate including income and/or principal, all cash including bank 
accounts, and all proceeds from life insurance policies and further[] said Trustee to distribute his 
share of the Trust Estate to PHILLIP D. SOUTH WICK." 
17. Barbara delivered the Waiver and Assignment to Phillip, who as Trustee approved 
and accepted the Waiver and Assignment into the Trust on March 12, 1992. At that time, Phillip 
knew that attorney Dale Dorius had prepared the Trust and other Trust documents, andhad 
advised Don and Barbara off and on regarding the trust, and that Mr. Dorius had prepared the 
Waiver and Assignment, as well. 
18. Robert consented to the Waiver and Assignment and Tracy's renunciation of his 
status as a beneficiary of the Trust such that Tracy would no longer have any interest in the 
Trust. 
19. Tracy made a statement that he was renouncing his beneficial interest in the Trust 
by signing the Waiver and Assignment. 
20. When Tracy signed the Waiver and Assignment, he was married to Germaine 
Southwick ("Germaine"). 
21. Tracy and Germaine were married for approximately 8 years. 
22. During the course of their marriage, Germaine witnessed Tracy sign various 
documents and consequently she became familiar with his signature for purposes other than this 
litigation. 
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23. Tracy periodically sent Robert cards bearing his signature and as a result, Robert 
also became familiar with Tracy's signature for purposes other than this litigation. 
24. Phillip believed that the Decree of Divorce was a valid directive requiring that 
Barbara become the sole Trustor and sole Beneficiary of the Trust, and that as a result she was 
free to modify and/or terminate the Trust and/or control the property at her discretion. 
25. Barbara told Phillip that she planned and intended to carry on with the Trust, 
since Don and Tracy were no longer beneficiaries, in order to avoid potential federal tax 
consequences associated with having all of the Trust property transferred to her individually and 
to avoid the inconvenience and cost of setting up a new trust. 
26. Barbara told Phillip that it was her intent and desire that Robert and Phillip 
receive the trust property upon her death and that accordingly they remain as beneficiaries of the 
Trust and that the property would be evenly split between Phillip and Robert upon her death. 
27. For these reasons, Phillip reasonably believed it unnecessary to transfer all of the 
Trust property from a trust which purportedly no longer named Don or Tracy as beneficiaries 
into a second trust of the same status. 
28. As a result of Barbara's expression of her plans and intent, Phillip and Robert did 
not ever purport to renounce their interests in the Trust, nor were they asked to renounce their 
interest in the Trust. 
29. Barbara died in February of 2002. 
30. In a letter addressed to and received by Phillip dated April 7, 2002, Tracy wrote 
that he did not remember whether or not he signed the Waiver and Assignment, that he was not 
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going to do anything about the Trust, and that Phillip and Robert could do whatever they wanted 
with the Trust assets. 
31. In a letter addressed to and received by Robert dated April 20, 2002, Tracy again 
wrote that he did not remember whether or not he signed the Waiver and Assignment, that he 
was not going to do anything about the Trust, and that Phillip and Robert could do whatever they 
wanted with the Trust assets. 
32. Just prior to writing these letters, Tracy and Phillip had argued over Tracy's 
claimed interest in the Trust and/or assets of Barbara, with Tracy claiming he still had an interest, 
and Phillip arguing otherwise. 
33. After Barbara's death and the receipt of Tracy's letter dated April 7, 2002, Phillip 
liquidated or sold some real property distributed those proceeds and a few other Trust assets 
equally between himself and Robert under the reasonable belief that he and Robert were the only 
beneficiaries of the Trust in reasonable reliance upon the Waiver and Assignment as well as 
Tracy's letters stating that Phillip and Robert could do whatever they wanted with the estate and 
that Tracy wasn't going to anything about it. 
34. Phillip would not have made the Trust property distributions he made or would 
have taken other measures had Tracy not signed the Waiver and Assignment and not written the 
letters and made the statements therein. 
35. When Tracy filed the Complaint in the above-entitled matter, the property 
remaining in the Trust included a horse trailer, a travel trailer, five burial plots in the Lehi 
cemetery, and approximately 80 acres of real property located in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Phillip had before him many documents and information which caused or allowed 
him to manage the Trust the way he did in this case. Chief among them was the Divorce Decree, 
the instructions from Don and Barbara, the Wavier and Assignment, the letters from Tracy to 
Phillip and Robert, and his mother's statements. 
2. After the divorce, Phillip was presented with the Waiver and Assignment which had 
been prepared by an attorney and had been signed by Tracy, which purported to renounce, waive 
or otherwise alienate Tracy's interest in the Trust, reasonably consistent with the divorce decree 
or its overriding intent. Moreover, upon delivering the Waiver and Assignment to Phillip, 
Barbara informed him that Tracy had signed the document. While this statement is hearsay as to 
whether Tracy actually signed it, it is not hearsay as to what Phillip was told and what he was 
allowed to believe at the time. Phillip had no reason to believe that Tracy had not signed the 
Waiver and Assignment or to question its authenticity. 
3. In determining that Tracy signed the Wavier and Assignment, the Court considered 
Germaine and Robert's testimony of their familiarity with Tracy's signature. In addition, 
numerous documents were authenticated and admitted into evidence bearing Tracy's signature. 
4. In determining that Tracy signed the Wavier and Assignment, the Court also 
compared the documents authenticated and admitted into evidence bearing Tracy's signature 
with the signature on the Waiver and Assignment. 
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5. In determining that Tracy signed the waiver and assignment, the Court did not 
consider any testimony which would have been hearsay if offered to prove that Tracy had signed 
the Waiver and Assignment, such as Barbara's comments referenced above. 
6. Germaine and Robert's familiarity with Tracy's signature was not gained for 
purposes of this litigation. 
7. Tracy's earlier assertion that he could not remember or recall signing the Wavier and 
Assignment and his more recent assertion that he did not sign or make a statement renouncing 
his beneficial interest in the Trust constitute inconsistent claims later asserted. His testimony at 
trial that he did not sign the Waiver and Assignment was unconvincing and appeared to be for 
the purposes of this litigation rather than from knowledge or remembrance in light of his 
admissions in the letters he sent to Robert and Phillip in 2002 that he did not remember whether 
or not he signed the Waiver and Assignment. 
8. Phillip managed and distributed Trust assets and their proceeds in reasonable reliance 
upon Tracy's statement that he was renouncing his beneficial interest in the Trust (Waiver and 
Assignment) and Tracy's letters, all reasonably consistent with the Divorce Decree, the written 
instructions from Don and Barbara and Barbara's statements. 
9. Moreover, Tracy's letters caused Phillip to believe that the issue of Tracy claiming or 
having any interest in the Trust had been resolved and that Phillip could move forward consistent 
with his position on the matter, free from claims or demands of Tracy. 
10. As a result, Phillip distributed assets from the Trust, which he would not have done, 
or would have done differently. 
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11. Phillip's reliance (liquidation and distribution of trust assets) on Tracy's statements 
would operate to Phillip's detriment if Tracy were allowed now to assert that he did not renounce 
his beneficial interest in the Trust and/or that he claims an interest in all assets and property of 
the Trust. 
12. Accordingly, Phillip did not breach his fiduciary duties or Trust obligations owed to 
the Beneficiaries of the Trust generally, or to Tracy specifically. 
13. After the filing of the Complaint in the above-entitled matter, Phillip no longer relied 
on Tracy's statements. 
14. Accordingly, Tracy is equitably estopped from asserting that, prior to the filing of the 
Complaint in the above-entitled matter, he did not renounce his beneficial interest in the Trust by 
signing the Wavier and Assignment, and is estopped from making any claims against the Trust or 
Phillip individually or as Trustee related to Trust distributions or management prior to the filling 
of the Complaint. 
15. However, Tracy's Waiver and Assignment did not strictly comply with Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-2-802 (1991), which was the relevant Disclaimer Statute in force in 1992. 
16. Consequently, Tracy is entitled to a beneficial interest in the remaining Trust 
property, which consists of approximately 80 acres of land in Salt Lake County, five burial plots 
a horse trailer and a travel trailer. 
17. Phillip did not mismanage any of the Trust assets, property or proceeds. 
9 0C1G74 
18. Apart from being awarded a beneficial interest in the Trust as to the remaining or un 
distributed Trust Property only, Tracy is not entitled to an award of any damages, costs or his 
attorney fees in this matter. 
DATED this °l day of O^ , 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
M 
Ben H. Hadfield 
RICT COURT JU 
RULE 7(f)(2) NOTICE 
Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the undersigned will 
submit the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to Judge Ben 
H. Hadfield, District Court Judge, for signature at the expiration of five (5) days from the date of 
mailing herein, unless written objection is filed prior to that time. 
SMITH KNOWj.ES 
StephenTTNoel 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this <•>[) day of September 2009,1 mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document by first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Matthew G. Grimmer 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
P.O. Box 4050 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-4050 
IVhf/^ 
Legal Assistant 
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UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 75-2-802 
7fi 2-612. Ademption by satisfaction. 
Pr erty which a testator gave in his lifetime to a 
is treated as a satisfaction of a devise to that 
^ s o n in whole or in part, only if the will provides for 
ifduction of the lifetime gift, or the testator declares 
a writing that the gift is to be deducted from the 
IT vise or is in satisfaction of the devise, or the devisee 
acknowledges in writing that the gift is in satisfac-
tion For purpose of partial satisfaction, property 
n during lifetime is valued as of the time the 
devisee came into possession or enjoyment of the 
operty
 o r a s 0 f t h e t i m e of d e a t h of the testator , 
whichever occurs first. 1975 
75-2-613. Marital deduct ion formulas — Wills. 
For estates of decedents dying after December 31, 
1981, where a decedent's will executed before Sep-
tember 13,1981, contains a formula expressly provid-
ing that the decedent's spouse is to receive the maxi-
mum amount of property qualifying for the marital 
deduction allowable by federal law, this formula shall 
be construed as referring to the unlimited marital 
deduction allowable by federal law as amended by 
Section 403(a) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 
1981. 1982 
75-2-614. Direction to pay taxes in will. 
A general direction in a will to pay all taxes im-
posed as a result of a testator 's death or similar lan-
guage shall not be construed to include taxes imposed 
n a "generation skipping transfer" under Section 
301 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (or any 
successor or amended section of similar content) un-
less the testator shall express an intention that these 
taxes be paid out of his es tate by reference to the 
generation skipping tax or otherwise. 1983 
PART 7 
CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS 
RELATING TO DEATH 
75-2-701. Contracts concerning succession. 
A contract to make a will or devise, or not to revoke 
a will or devise, or to die intestate, if executed after 
the effective date of this part, can be established only 
by provisions of a will stating material provisions of 
the contract; an express reference in a will to a con-
tract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the 
contract; or a writing signed by the decedent evidenc-
ing the contract. The execution of a joint will or mu-
tual wills does not create a presumption of a contract 
not to revoke the will or wills. 1975 
PART 8 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
75-2-801. Renunciation of succession. 
(DA person or the representative of an incapaci-
tated, protected, or deceased person, who is an heir, 
devisee, person succeeding to a renounced interest, 
beneficiary under a testamentary instrument, or ap-
pointee under a power of appointment exercised by a 
testamentary instrument, may renounce in whole or 
i part the right of succession to any property or in-
terest in it, including a future interest, by filing a 
written renunciation under this section. The instru-
ment shall describe the property or interest re-
nounced, declare the renunciation and extent of it, 
and be signed by the person renouncing. 
(2) (a) An instrument renouncing a present mter-
the death of the decedent or the donee of the 
power. 
(b) An instrument renouncing a future inter-
est may be filed not later than nine months after 
the event determining that the taker of the prop-
erty or interest is finally ascertained and his in-
terest is indefeasibly vested. 
(c) The renunciation shall be filed in the court 
of the county in which proceedings have been 
commenced for the administration of the estate of 
the deceased owner or deceased donee of the 
power or, if they have not been commenced, in 
which they could be commenced. A copy of the 
renunciation shall be delivered in person or 
mailed by registered or certified mail to any per-
sonal representative or other fiduciary of the de-
cedent or donee of the power. If real property or 
an interest in it is renounced, a copy of the re-
nunciation may be recorded in the office of the 
county recorder for the county in which the real 
estate is situated. 
(3) Unless the decedent or donee of the power has 
otherwise provided, the property or interest re-
nounced devolves as though the person renouncing 
had predeceased the decedent or, if the person re-
nouncing is designated to take under a power of ap-
pointment exercised by a testamentary instrument, 
as though the person renouncing had predeceased the 
donee of the power. A future interest that takes effect 
in possession or enjoyment after the termination of 
the estate or interest renounced takes effect as 
though the person renouncing had predeceased the 
decedent or the donee of the power. A renunciation 
relates back for all purposes to the date of the death 
of the decedent or the donee of the power. 
(4) (a) The right to renounce property or an inter-
est in it is barred by: (i) an assignment, convey-
ance, encumbrance, pledge, or transfer of the 
property or interest, or a contract therefor; (ii) a 
written waiver of the right to renounce; (iii) an 
acceptance of the property or interest or benefit 
thereunder; or (iv) a sale of the property or inter-
est under judicial sale made before the renuncia-
tion is effected. 
(b) The right to renounce exists notwithstand-
ing any limitation on the interest of the person 
renouncing in the nature of a spendthrift provi-
sion or similar restriction. 
(c) A renunciation or a written waiver of the 
right to renounce is binding upon the person re-
nouncing or person waiving and all persons 
claiming through or under him. 
(5) This section does not abridge the right of a per-
son to waive, release, assign, convey, disclaim, or re-
nounce property or an interest in it under any other 
section of this code or other statute. 
(6) An interes t in property exist ing on t h e effective 
date of th is section as to which the t ime for filing a 
renunciat ion under this section would have begun to 
run were th is section in effect when the in te res t was 
created, may be renounced within nine mon ths after 
the effective date of this section. 1977 
75-2-802. Disclaimer of transfer, procedures, 
and effect. 
(1) (a) A person, or the representative of an inca-
pacitated, protected, or deceased person, who is a 
grantee, donee, surviving joint tenant, person 
succeeding to a disclaimed interest, beneficiary 
under a nontesjt*atr»efijtat*)rinstrument or contract, 
or appointee uLH&r Upiwe'r-bf appointment exer-
ciaim\|j§*wnoie or in part ttie right ot transfer to 
the person of any property or interest in it by 
delivering or filing a written disclaimer under 
this section. A surviving joint tenant or tenant 
by the entireties, or the representative of that 
person, if deceased, may disclaim as a separate 
interest any property or interest in it devolving 
to the person by right of survivorship. A surviv-
ing joint tenant or tenant by the entireties, or the 
representative of that person, if deceased, may 
disclaim the entire interest in any property or 
interest in it that is the subject of a joint tenancy 
or tenancy by the entireties devolving to the per-
son, if the joint tenancy was created by act of a 
deceased joint tenant or tenant by the entireties, 
if the survivor did not join in creating the joint 
tenancy or tenancy by the entireties, and neither 
the survivor nor the representative of a deceased 
survivor has accepted a benefit thereunder, 
(b) The disclaimer shall: 
(i) describe the property or interest in it 
disclaimed; 
(ii) declare the disclaimer and extent of it; 
(iii) be signed by the disclaimant; and 
(iv) state that the disclaimer is proper un-
der Subsection (4), and was made within the 
required time limits. 
(2) (a) An instrument disclaiming a present in-
terest shall be delivered or filed no later than 
nine months after the effective date of the non-
testamentary instrument or contract; and an in-
strument disclaiming a future interest shall be 
delivered or filed not later than nine months af-
ter the event determining that the taker of the 
property or interest is Finally ascertained and the 
interest is indefeasibiy vested. If the person enti-
tled to disclaim does not have actual knowledge 
of the existence of the interest, the instrument 
shall be delivered or filed not later than nine 
months after the person has actual knowledge of 
the existence of the interest. The effective date of 
a revocable instrument or contract is the date on 
which the maker no longer has power to revoke it 
or to transfer to the maker or another the entire 
legal and equitable ownership of the interest. 
(b) The disclaimer, or a copy of it, shall be de-
livered in person or mailed by registered or certi-
fied mail to the trustee or another person having 
legal title to, or possession of, the property or 
interest disclaimed or who is entitled to it in the 
event of disclaimer. If real property or an interest 
in it is disclaimed, a copy of the instrument shall 
be filed for record in the office of the county re-
corder of the county in which the real estate is 
situated and until filed and recorded, the notice 
of disclaimer is not effective against third parties 
relying on the public records. 
(3) Unless the nontestamentary instrument or con-
tract provides for another disposition, the property or 
interest in it disclaimed shall devolve as if the dis-
claimant had died before the effective date of the in-
strument or contract. A disclaimer relates back for all 
purposes to that date. A future interest that takes 
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the termi-
nation of the disclaimed interest takes effect as if the 
disclaimant had died before the effective date of the 
instrument or contract that transferred the dis-
claimed interest. When a disclaimer is made by the 
representative of an incapacitated, protected, or de-
ceased person, the "disclaimant" for purposes of de-
termining how the property or interest devolves shall 
be the incapacitated, protected, or deceased person. 
(4) S^JfJPFhe right to disclaim property or an inter-
est in it is barred by: 
(i) an assignment, conveyance, encum-
brance, pledge, or transfer of the property or 
interest, or a contract therefor; 
(ii) a written waiver of the right to dis-
claim; 
(iii) an acceptance of the property or inter-
est or benefit thereunder, ot 
(iv) a sale of the property or interest under 
judicial sale made before the disclaimer is 
effected. 
(b) The right to disclaim exists notwithstand-
ing any limitation on the interest of the disclaim-
ant in the nature of a spendthrift provision or 
similar restriction. 
(c) The instrument of disclaimer or the written 
waiver of the right to disclaim is binding upon 
the disclaimant or person waiving and all per-
sons claiming through or under that person. 
(5) This section does not abridge the right of per-
sons to waive, release, assign, convey, disclaim, or 
renounce property or an interest in it under any other 
statute. 
(6) An interest in property existing on the effective 
date of this section as to which, if a present interest, 
the time for filing a disclaimer under this section has 
not expired, or if a future interest, the interest has 
not become indefeasibiy vested or the taker finally 
ascertained, may be disclaimed within nine months 
after the effective date of this section. 1988 
75-2-803. Effect of divorce, annulment, and de-
cree of separation. 
(1) A person who is divorced from the decedent or 
whose marriage to the decedent has been annulled is 
not a surviving spouse unless, by virtue of a subse-
quent marriage, he is married to the decedent at the 
time of death. A decree of separation which does not 
terminate the status of husband and wife is not a 
divorce for purposes of this section. An interlocutory 
decree of divorce or annulment is a divorce or annul-
ment for the purposes of this section. 
(2) For purposes of Parts 1, 2, 3, and 4 of this chap-
ter and of Section 75-3-203, a surviving spouse does 
not include: 
(a) A person who obtains or consents to a final 
decree or judgment of divorce from the decedent 
or an annulment of their marriage, which decree 
or judgment is not recognized as valid in this 
state, unless they subsequently participate in a 
marriage ceremony purporting to marry each to 
the other, or subsequently live together as man 
and wife; 
(b) A person who, following a decree or judg-
ment of divorce or annulment obtained by the 
decedent, participates in a marriage ceremony 
with a third person; or 
(c) A person who was a party to a valid pro-
ceeding concluded by an order purporting to ter-
minate all marital property rights. 1975 
75-2-804. Effect of homicide on intestate succes-
sion, wills, joint assets, life insurance 
and beneficiary designations. 
(1) A surviving spouse, heir, or devisee who feloni-
ously and intentionally kills the decedent is not enti-
tled to any benefits under the will or under this chap-
ter, and the estate of decedent passes as if the killer 
had predeceased the decedent. Property appointed by 
the will of the decedent to or for the benefit of the 
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